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Aristotle, in Chapter VII of his Categories, classifies habits and dispositions, as well as 
knowledge, among relatives. However, in Chapter VIII of the Categories, he affirms that habits, 
including knowledge, and dispositions, including unstable knowledge, are qualities. Thus, 
habits and dispositions in general, and knowledge in particular, seem to be subject to a “dual 
categorization”. At the end of Chapter VIII of the treatise, the issue of the dual categorization 
is explicitly raised. How can one and the same thing be a quality and a relative? Aristotle gives 
two distinct solutions to this problem. Both have been criticized by some modern 
commentators: these solutions would amount to a rejection of the basic principles of the 
categorial system and, as such, to a sort of philosophical suicide. However, Aristotle’s early 
commentators, notably the Greek Neoplatonists and Boethius, made attempts to render both 
solutions plausible and compatible with the rest of the doctrine. Their attempts are not only of 
exegetical interest, they also contain some significant philosophical analyses concerning the 
categories. In what follows, I will present the abovementioned problem of dual categorization 
in Aristotle and the two solutions offered to it in Categories VIII, 11a20-38. I will then turn to 	
1 This article was written in the context of the SNF research project “Dispositions and Relations in Late 
Ancient and Early Medieval Philosophy”, University of Lausanne (SNF 152884). As part of this project, an 
anthology, in French, of Antic and Medieval commentaries on Chapter VII of Aristotle’s Categories is in 
preparation, under the direction of Christophe Erismann and Jocelyn Groisard, and the working translations 
of Jocelyn Groisard (Porphyry, Ammonius, Simplicius, and Olympiodorus) and Charles Girard (Boethius) 
were very useful to me when preparing this article. I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for 
his comments on a previous version of this article. Besides, I wish to thank greatly Alessandra Lukinovich 
for her precious help in Ancient Greek. Finally, I thank Nicole Osborne for having checked my English. 
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the early reception of this text, and focus on the way the Greek Neoplatonists and Boethius tried 
to make Aristotle’s solutions more plausible. Throughout, I will try to establish in what sense 
habits and dispositions in general, and knowledge in particular, are relative. I will conclude 
with some remarks on the later reception of Categories VIII, 11a20-38 and on the problem of 
the ontological status of mental acts and states. 
 
I. Aristotle’s Categories VIII, 11a20-38 
In the beginning of Chapter VII of his Categories, Aristotle affirms that habit (ἕξις), disposition 
(διάθεσις), sensation (αἴσθησις), knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and position (θέσις) are relatives (πρός 
τι)2. Later in the chapter, he holds that every piece of knowledge is the knowledge “of a 
knowable” (ἐπιστητοῦ), just as every sensation is the sensation “of a sensible” (αἰσθητοῦ)3. In 
other words, knowledge, like sensation, is always of an “object”4. Yet, knowledge being a habit, 
unstable knowledge being a disposition 5 , and all habits and dispositions being relative, 
knowledge and unstable knowledge, besides being relative like sensation, are seemingly also 
relative like habits and dispositions in general. Following J. Ackrill and K. Oehler6, there are 
two ways to explain why habits and dispositions in general, as well as positions, are included 
among relatives. The first is to say that habits, dispositions and positions are relative in the 
sense that they are always of a “subject” (Zugrundeliegendes)7. The other is to affirm that habits, 	
2 Cat. VII, 6b1-6, and Categories, transl. J. L. Ackrill, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised 
Oxford Translation, J. Barnes (ed.), 2 vol., Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 1984 (Bollinger Series 
71.2). For “ἕξις” and “διάθεσις”, instead of the standard translations “state” and “condition”, I will follow F. 
Ildefonse and J. Lallot’s “habitus” and “disposition” (ARISTOTE, Catégories, transl. and comm. F. Ildefonse 
– J. Lallot, Seuil, Paris 1986 [Points. Essais]), in order to keep the idea of “having” in “ἕξις”’s translation, as 
well as the lexical proximity between “διάθεσις” and “θέσις” in their translations. 
3 See Cat. VII, 6b34-35 and more broadly 7b22-8a12.  
4  See also Met. Δ, 15, 1021a26-1021b3, where Aristotle admits three classes of relations – relations 
“according to number” (κατ’ ἀριθμόν), relations “according to potency” (κατὰ δύναμιν), and relations 
between the “measure” (μέτρον) and the “measurable” (μετρητόν) – and includes knowledge, sensation and 
“thought” (διάνοια) in the third class. The term “object”, which I use for the sake of commodity, is not found 
explicitly in Aristotle, but has medieval origins. On these questions, see O. BOULNOIS, Être, luire et 
concevoir. Note sur la genèse et la structure de la conception scotiste de l’esse obiective, «Collectanea 
Franciscana» 60, 1990, pp. 117-135, and, more generally, A. DE LIBERA, Archéologie du sujet I. Naissance 
du sujet, Vrin, Paris 2007 (Histoire de la philosophie), pp. 133-154. 
5 For unstable knowledge as a disposition, see Cat. VIII, 9a4-8. 
6 ARISTOTLE, Categories and De Interpretatione, transl. and comm. J. L. Ackrill, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1993 (Clarendon Aristotle Series), ad 6a36 and ARISTOTELES, Kategorien, transl. and comm. K. Oehler, 2nd 
ed., Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1986, ad 6a36 sq. 
7 A similar point is made by A. Trendelenburg, who thinks that Aristotle admits among relatives things linked 
by a “subjective genitive”, more precisely by the genitive of the “possessor” (Genitiv des Subjectes, z. B. des 
Besitzers) (F. A. TRENDELENBURG, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, vol. 1, G. Bethge, Berlin 1846, pp. 119-
121). Moreover, Sten Ebbesen holds that Aristotle, in Chapters VII and VIII of the Categories, is confused 
by the fact that: “Knowledge, ἐπιστήμη in Greek, is a deverbative noun. The verb ‛to know’ is divalent, i.e. 
it requires two arguments, a subject and an object. Basically the same applies to the derived noun, knowledge 
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dispositions and positions are relative in the sense that they must be “specified”: for example, 
there are habits of virtue, there are, in turn, virtues of justice, of temperance, etc8. However, as 
J. Ackrill and K. Oehler also underscore, both solutions entail problems. According to the first 
solution, every accident would be a relative, since every accident is of a “subject”. According 
to the second solution, every genus would be a relative, since every genus has species. In both 
cases, relatives would not be limited to one category, but would play a transcategorial role. 
Thus, it seems like a problematic idea to admit habits, dispositions and positions among 
relatives for such reasons. Aristotle, in Physics VII, 3, again mentions the relativity of habits, 
both bodily and psychic9. He holds that bodily virtuous habits, such as “health” (ὑγίεια), are “a 
blending of hot and cold elements in due proportion, in relation either to one another within the 
body or to the surrounding”10. Following Simplicius, psychic virtuous habits, for example 
temperance, could be understood similarly, in that they are “due proportions” of “emotions” 
(θυμοί) and “appetites” (ἐπιθυμίαι)11. As for vicious habits, like disease and intemperance, these 
would not be “due proportions” (συμμετρίαι), but “disproportions” (ἀσυμμετρίαι) of the same 
elements12. Mutatis mutandis, these considerations could also apply to dispositions13. Thus, 
even if Physics VII cannot explain the relativity of positions, since there is seemingly neither 
“due proportion” nor “disproportion” in them, it could at least solve the difficulties raised by J. 
Ackrill and K. Oehler concerning the relativity of habits and dispositions14 . At any rate, 
knowledge is probably relative like all other habits and dispositions, i.e. for the same reason 
	
must be somebody’s knowledge of something” (S. EBBESEN, A Porretanean and a Nominalis on Relations, 
unpublished talk, given at the conference “The Logic and Ontology of Relations in the 12th Century”, 
Lausanne, March 2012). These interpretations seem to be confirmed by Top. IV, 4, 124b32-34, where 
Aristotle says that knowledge is not only relative to an “object”, but, as an habit or a disposition, relative by 
being “of the soul” (ψυχῆς). 
8 For the examples, see Cat. VIII, 8b33 and 11a27-28, transl. J. Ackrill. See also ARISTOTLE, Categories and 
De Interpretatione, comm. J. L. Ackrill, op. cit., ad 6a36. 
9 See Phys. VII, 3, 245b3-248a9. 
10 ἐν κράσει καὶ συμμετρίᾳ θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν τίθεμεν, ἢ αὐτῶν πρὸς αὑτὰ τῶν ἐντὸς ἢ πρὸς τὸ περιέχον 
(Phys. VII, 3, 246b5-6, and Physics, transl. R. P. Hardie – R. K. Gaye, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. 
The Revised Oxford Translation, op. cit). 
11 See SIMPLICIUS, In Phys., CAG X, ed. H. Diels, 1071.18-30, and On Aristotle. Physics 7, transl. and comm. 
Ch. Hagen, Duckworth, London 1994 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle).  
12 See SIMPLICIUS, In Phys., CAG X, ed. H. Diels, 1067.5-10, and 1071.18-30 again, transl. Ch. Hagen.  
13 Note that “health”, given as an example of bodily virtuous “habit” by Aristotle in Phys. VII, 3, is a 
disposition according to Cat. VIII, 8b35-37. 
14 For the interpretation of all habits and dispositions, including knowledge, in terms of relatives of “activity 
and passivity”, on the basis of an exegesis of Physics VII, 3, see O. HARARI, The Unity of Aristotle’s Category 
of Relatives, «Classical Quarterly» 61, 2011, pp. 521-537. On Physics VII more generally, see R. WARDY, 
The Chain of Change. A Study of Aristotle’s Physics VII, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990 
(Cambridge Classical Studies). 
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that they are relative, no matter what this reason may be, but knowledge as such has also another 
relativity, namely its being of a knowable, i.e. of an “object”15.  
Now, independently of how they are relative, a major problem, if habits and dispositions 
in general and the habit or disposition of knowledge in particular are relative, is that they would 
be submitted to a “dual categorization”16. Indeed, habits and dispositions, and thus the habit or 
disposition of knowledge, are not only relative, they are also included among qualities17. 
According to a famous distinction made by D. Sedley, such relatives, i.e. relatives affected by 
dual categorization, are “soft relatives”, in contrast to “hard” ones: they are “relative” according 
to the first definition given by Aristotle in Chapter VII of the Categories (“we call relatives all 
such things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some other way in 
relation to something else”), but not according to the second definition (“those things are 
relatives for which being is the same as being somehow related to something”), which is, for 
D. Sedley, “stronger and narrower, singling out those properties which consist in a relation and 
nothing more”18. However, such an interpretation seems difficult to defend, since knowledge is 
mentioned as a relative falling under the second definition in Topics VI, 819. Independently of 
D. Sedley’s distinction between “soft” and “hard relatives”, it appears that habits and 
dispositions, including knowledge, are not only relatives, but also qualities. The issue of the 
dual categorization of habits and dispositions in general, and of knowledge in particular, is 
explicitly tackled by Aristotle in Chapter VIII of the Categories. The text runs as follows: 	
15 See also the developments in ARISTOTLE, Categories and De Interpretatione, comm. J. L. Ackrill, op. cit., 
ad 6a36 and ARISTOTELES, Kategorien, comm. K. Oehler, op. cit., ad 6a36 sq. Certainly, if knowledge is 
relative by being of an “object” whereas habits and dispositions are relative for another reason, knowledge 
as such and knowledge according to its genus would be differently relative (I thank Charles Girard for this 
observation). Yet such a consequence is considered by Aristotle himself in Top. IV, 4, 124b32-34, quoted 
above: knowledge as such is relative to the knowable, but as a habit or disposition it is relative to the soul. 
16  This problem does not concern positions, which, according to Aristotle’s explicit statement, are not 
included in another category, nor form another category, even if there is a category called “being-in-a-
position” (κεῖσθαι). On this difficult point, see Cat. IX, 11b10-11, transl. J. Ackrill.  
17 See Cat. VIII, 8b26-9a13.  
18 Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον 
(…) ἔστι τὰ πρός τι οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν (Cat. VII, 6a36-37 and 8a31-32, transl. J. 
Ackrill). See D. SEDLEY, Relatività aristoteliche, «Dianoia», 2, 1997, pp. 11-25 and «Dianoia», 3, 1998, pp. 
11-23; translation: Aristotelian Relativities, in Le Style de la pensée. Recueil d’hommages à Jacques 
Brunschwig, M. Canto-Sperber – P. Pellegrin (eds.), Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2002 (Anagôgé), pp. 324-352, 
p. 334. 
19 See Top. VI, 8, 146b3-4. D. Sedley’s defence against this argument is to say that Aristotle’s theory was 
not yet fully established in the Topics (see D. SEDLEY, Aristotelian Relativities, op. cit., p. 345 n. 34). 
Another, more general argument against D. Sedley’s distinction between “soft” and “hard relatives” would 
be that the second definition is merely a different formulation of the first, as stated in F. CAUJOLLE-
ZASLAWSKY, Les relatifs dans les Catégories, in Concepts et catégories dans la pensée antique, P. Aubenque 
(ed.), Vrin, Paris 1980 (Bibliothèque d’histoire de la philosophie), pp. 167-195. See also, more recently, M. 
DUNCOMBE, Aristotle’s Two Accounts of Relatives in Categories 7, «Phronesis», 60, 2015, pp. 436-461, who 
denies that there are two definitions of relatives, one with a “narrower extension” than the other. 
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We should not be disturbed lest someone may say that though we proposed to discuss quality 
we are counting in many relatives (since habits and dispositions are relatives). For in pretty 
well all such cases the genera are spoken of in relation to something, but none of the 
particular cases is. For knowledge, a genus, is called just what it is, of something else (it is 
called knowledge of something); but none of the particular cases is called just what it is, of 
something else. For example, grammar is not called grammar of something nor music music 
of something. If at all it is in virtue of the genus that these too are spoken of in relation to 
something: grammar is called knowledge of something (not grammar of something) and 
music knowledge of something (not music of something). Thus the particular cases are not 
relatives. But it is with the particular cases that we are said to be qualified, for it is these 
which we possess (it is because we have some particular knowledge that we are called 
knowledgeable). Hence these – the particular cases, in virtue of which we are on occasion 
said to be qualified – would indeed be qualities; and these are not relatives. Moreover, if the 
same thing really is a qualified and a relative there is nothing absurd in its being counted in 
both the genera.20 
 
Aristotle gives two explanations meant to solve the problem of dual categorization. Both have 
been considered unsatisfactory by some modern commentators. According to the first 
explanation, whereas knowledge as a genus would be relative, its “individuals” (καθ' ἕκαστα) 
would not21. Ackrill seems to think that the individuals of knowledge are not “individuals” 
stricto sensu, but species of knowledge, for example “grammar” or “music”22. On this basis, he 
says: “the claim that a genus that is relative may have species that are not relative seems to 
conflict with Aristotle's whole idea of a genus-species classification and categorial ladders”23. 
Indeed, how could grammar be a species of knowledge, knowledge be classified among 
	
20 Οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταράττεσθαι μή τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπὲρ ποιότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν πρός τι 
συγκαταριθμεῖσθαι· τὰς γὰρ ἕξεις καὶ τὰς διαθέσεις τῶν πρός τι εἶναι. σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων 
τὰ γένη πρός τι λέγεται, τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα οὐδέν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη, γένος οὖσα, αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου 
λέγεται, – τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται. – τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα οὐδὲν αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, οἷον ἡ 
γραμματικὴ οὐ λέγεται τινὸς γραμματικὴ οὐδ' ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς μουσική, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα κατὰ τὸ γένος καὶ αὗται 
πρός τι λέγεται· οἷον ἡ γραμματικὴ λέγεται τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς γραμματική, καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς 
ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς μουσική· ὥστε αἱ καθ' ἕκαστα οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι. λεγόμεθα δὲ ποιοὶ ταῖς καθ' ἕκαστα· 
ταύτας γὰρ καὶ ἔχομεν, – ἐπιστήμονες γὰρ λεγόμεθα τῷ ἔχειν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐπιστημῶν τινά· – ὥστε αὗται 
ἂν καὶ ποιότητες εἴησαν αἱ καθ' ἕκαστα, καθ' ἅς ποτε καὶ ποιοὶ λεγόμεθα· αὗται δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι. – 
ἔτι εἰ τυγχάνει τὸ αὐτὸ ποιὸν καὶ πρός τι ὄν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς γένεσιν αὐτὸ καταριθμεῖσθαι 
(Cat. VIII, 11a20-38, transl. J. Ackrill, slightly modified, notably for “ἕξις” and “διάθεσις”). 
21 See also Topics IV, 4, 124b15-22 and Met. Δ, 15, 1021a4-6. 
22 Ackrill’s interpretation echoes a statement by Aristotle himself in Topics IV, 4, 124b18-19. 
23 ARISTOTLE, Categories and De Interpretatione, comm. J. L. Ackrill, op. cit., ad 11a20. 
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relatives, and grammar not be classified among relatives24? Similar problems would arise if 
“individuals” was taken stricto sensu25. According to Ackrill, a “conflict” with the rest of 
Aristotle’s theory also arises in the second solution. Indeed, the second solution simply consists 
in admitting that one and the same thing could belong to two categories. This affirmation has 
been criticized by M. Frede, and led him to suspect the authenticity of the passage, since “there 
is no other place in the corpus where the possibility is considered that the highest genera are 
not mutually exclusive”26. Indeed, isn’t, for example, ‘being’ said “in many ways” (πολλαχῶς), 
i.e. in many “mutually exclusive” ways27? Now, not only did some modern commentators find 
Aristotle’s solutions to the problem of dual categorization “perplexing”, as Ackrill says28, early 
readers of the Categories, i.e. the Greek commentators and Boethius, did too. Being more 
reverent to Aristotle’s authority, they were not much inclined to criticize the two solutions 
present in the abovementioned text, and the rejection of the authenticity of the passage was 
apparently not an option. On the contrary, they more or less tried to justify Aristotle’s 
affirmations, and to accommodate the passage with the rest of the theory. In the following 
pages, I will present the discussions of Aristotle’s Categories VIII, 11a20-38 by the Greek 
commentators, above all by Neoplatonists, and also by Boethius, whose commentary on the 
Categories can be included in the same tradition29. Due to the proximities between these 
discussions, they can easily be compared and are mutually enlightening. As a whole, they form 
a quasi-systematic attempt – and the oldest we know of – to solve the problems emerging from 
the dual categorization of habits and dispositions in Aristotle30. Before reading these authors 	
24 Although Aristotle does not explicitly say that knowledge is relative by definition, one would maybe think 
here of Cat. V, 3b2-5, where it is affirmed that the definition of a genus of essence (οὐσία) applies to its 
species. 
25 See again Cat. V, 3b2-5, where Aristotle affirms that the definition of a genus of essence (οὐσία) applies 
to its individuals; moreover, see Cat. V, 3a17-20. 
26 M. FREDE, “The Title, Unity and Authenticity of the Aristotelian Categories”, in Id., Essays in Ancient 
Philosophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987, pp. 11-28, p. 13. 
27 Met. Γ, 2, 1003a33. 
28 ARISTOTLE, Categories and De Interpretatione, comm. J. L. Ackrill, op. cit., ad 11a20. In line with Ackrill 
and Frede, F. MORALES, Relational Attributes in Aristotle, «Phronesis», 39, 1994, pp. 255-274, p. 265, finds 
this passage “perplexing”. By contrast, see O. HARARI, The Unity of Aristotle’s Category of Relatives, op. 
cit., pp. 534-535, and M. DUNCOMBE, Aristotle’s Two Accounts of Relatives in Categories 7, op. cit., pp. 458-
459, for two different modern attempts to make sense of Aristotle’s remarks. 
29  On the proximity of Boethius’ commentary on the Categories to Porphyry’s, see S. EBBESEN, The 
Aristotelian Commentator, in The Cambridge Companion to Boethius, J. Marenbon (ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2009 (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy), pp. 34-55. 
30 My statement that a quasi-system emerges from a transversal reading of Neoplatonic texts is circumscribed 
by the topic that I analyse: the reception of Categories VIII, 11a20-38. I do not mean to conclude from this 
observation any kind of general thesis on the unity of the Neoplatonic philosophy nor on the relations between 
the Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonic schools. On these difficult questions, see I. HADOT, Commentaire, 
in Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories, transl. Ph. Hoffmann – I. Hadot – P. Hadot, Brill, Leiden 
1989 (Philosophia Antiqua, 50), pp. 19-182. 
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on Categories VIII, 11a20-38, I will discuss in what sense they count habits and dispositions, 
as well as knowledge, among relatives. 
 
II. Aristotle’s early commentators on the relativity of habits and dispositions, and of 
knowledge in particular 
Porphyry, in his commentary on the Categories, says, quite astonishingly, that a habit is relative 
because it is a quality: every quality is “of something qualified” (ποιοῦ), i.e. of the bearer of the 
quality as bearing the quality31. In another passage of his commentary, he affirms that just as a 
position is of a “θετόν”, “a habit is the habit of a ἑκτόν”32. The same idea is to be found in 
Ammonius and Philoponus: just as a disposition is relative to a “διαθετόν”, “a habit is said of a 
ἑκτόν”33. Elias too mentions the habit as relative to the ἑκτόν, like a disposition is relative to a 
“διακείμενον”34. When Elias gives an example of a ἑκτόν, he mentions “the grammarian” 
(γραμματικός)35. S. Strange translates “ἑκτόν” in Porphyry as “thing capable of having a state”, 
and S. Cohen and G. Mattews translate “ἑκτόν” in Ammonius as “possessor”36. J. Groisard 
suggests translating it in Porphyry as “ce qui est dans cet état”, “that which is in this state”, and 
similarly in Ammonius37. Now, as B. Fleet underscores, the normal voice of the kind of verbal 
adjective in question (-τόν) is passive, and the literal translation of “ἑκτόν” would be 
“havable”38. But in Porphyry, the “ἑκτόν” is a case of “qualified thing” (ποιόν), as well as in 
Elias, since the example he gives of a “ἑκτόν” is “the grammarian” (γραμματικός). The idea 
seems to be that the habit is relative to its bearer as potentially or actually bearing the habit. 
Thus, although “ἑκτόν”’s literal translation would be “havable”, its translation as “thing capable 	
31 PORPHYRY, In Cat., CAG IV.1, ed. A. Busse, 114.9-12. 
32  ἡ μὲν ἕξις ἑκτοῦ ἕξις (PORPHYRY, In Cat., CAG IV.1, ed. A. Busse, 112.30-31, and On Aristotle 
Categories, transl. and comm. S. K. Strange, Duckworth, London 1992 [Ancient Commentators on 
Aristotle]).  
33 AMMONIUS, In Cat., CAG IV.4, ed. A. Busse, 68.14-19, and PHILOPONUS, In Cat., CAG XIII.1, ed. A. 
Busse, 106.21-23.  
34 ELIAS, In Cat., CAG XVIII.1, ed. A. Busse, 207.34-208.1. I assume that the commentary attributed by A. 
Busse to Elias is from Elias (on this question, see A. BUSSE, Praefatio and Supplementum praefationis, in 
Elias, In Cat., CAG XVIII.1, pp. v-xxxi, and R. GOULET, Élias, in Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, 
III, d’Eccélos à Juvenal, R. Goulet (ed.), CNRS Éditions, Paris 2000 [Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques], 
pp. 57-66). 
35 ELIAS, In Cat., CAG XVIII.1, ed. A. Busse, 229.26-27. 
36  PORPHYRY, On Aristotle Categories, transl. S. K. Strange, op. cit., and AMMONIUS, On Aristotle 
Categories, transl. and comm. S. M. Cohen, G. B. Matthews, Duckworth, London 1991 (Ancient 
Commentators on Aristotle).  
37 PORPHYRE, Commentaire aux Catégories d’Aristote par questions et réponses, CAG IV.1, 111.6-126.32, 
working translation by J. Groisard, and AMMONIUS, Commentaire aux Catégories d’Aristote, CAG IV.4, 
66.4-80.13, working translation by J. Groisard. 
38 SIMPLICIUS, On Aristotle’s “Categories 7-8”, transl. and comm. B. Fleet, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
NY 2002 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), p. 161 n. 54. 
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of having a state” and cognates is not unfaithful to its contextual meaning. At any rate, one 
should keep in mind that in Porphyry and Elias, and maybe also in Ammonius and Philoponus, 
the “ἑκτόν” is the bearer of the habit as potentially or actually bearing it. In the same manner, 
the “διαθετόν” or “διακείμενον”, literally the “dispositionable” or “disposed thing”, is the 
potential or actual bearer of the disposition, and the “θετόν”, literally the “positionable thing”, 
is the potential bearer of the position, its actual bearer, i.e. the “positioned thing”, being the 
“κείμενον”. In sum, habits, dispositions and positions are relative to their bearers as potentially 
or actually bearing them.  
Yet it is not certain that among Neoplatonic philosophers, “ἑκτόν” always refers to the 
bearer of the habit. Indeed, Simplicius seems to have another understanding of what a “ἑκτόν” 
is. He opposes the “ἑκτόν” to “the haver” (τὸ ἔχων) of the habit39. He asks whether a habit is 
relative to the “ἑκτόν” or “ἐχόμενον” (i.e. the actualised ἑκτόν) or to the “haver” (ἔχων). In such 
a context, it seems, following B. Fleet, that the best translation of “ἑκτόν” or “ἐχόμενον” is 
indeed “havable” or “had thing”40. Now, the idea that the habit is relative to the haver is 
explicitly rejected by Simplicius. According to Simplicius, the habit is in fact the “relation” 
(σχέσις) of having itself, holding “between” (μεταξύ) the haver and the “havable” or “had 
thing”41, and cannot itself be had, i.e. cannot be related to the haver, otherwise one would need 
a second relation of having relating the haver to the first having, etc.42. Simplicius seems to 
base his claim on Metaphysics Δ, 20, where Aristotle says that the “habit”, or the “having”, 
cannot itself be “had”:  
 
We call a having (1) a kind of activity of the haver and the had – something like an action or 
movement. When one thing makes and one is made, between them there is a making; so too 
between him who has a garment and the garment which he has there is a having. This sort of 
	
39 See SIMPLICIUS, In Cat., CAG VIII, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, 163.30-164.27, transl. B. Fleet. 
40 See again SIMPLICIUS, On Aristotle’s “Categories 7-8”, comm. B. Fleet, op. cit., p. 161 n. 54. 
41 SIMPLICIUS, In Cat., CAG VIII, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, 164.19-20 and 177.20-22, transl. B. Fleet. On the notion 
of ‘relation’ (σχέσις), see SIMPLICIUS, In Cat., CAG VIII, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, 201.34-203.13, as well as C. 
LUNA, La relation chez Simplicius, in Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Actes du colloque international 
de Paris (28 sept. – 1er oct. 1985), I. Hadot (ed.), Walter De Gruyter, Berlin 1987 (Peripatoi. Philologisch-
historische Studien zum Aristotelismus, 15), pp. 113-147, and O. HARARI, Simplicius on the Reality of 
Relations and Relational Change, «Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy» 37, 2009, pp. 245-274. This 
notion, which is often presented as Neoplatonic, is indeed discussed in PORPHYRE, In Cat., CAG IV.1, ed. 
A. Busse, 125.16-19, but it is already mentioned by Alexander of Aphrodisias: “relatives have their being in 
their relation to one another” (τὰ δὲ πρός τι ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσει τὸ εἶναι ἔχειν) (ALEXANDER OF 
APHRODISIAS, In Met., CAG I, ed. I. Bruns, 83.25-26). 
42 See also B. Fleet’s explanations in SIMPLICIUS, On Aristotle’s “Categories 7-8”, comm. B. Fleet, op. cit., 
p. 161 n. 58. 
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having, then, evidently we cannot have; for the process will go on to infinity, if we can have 
the having of what we have.43 
 
According to Simplicius, something similar would hold for dispositions and positions44. The 
idea seems to be that dispositions and positions are in fact the “relations” (σχέσεις) themselves 
of being-in-a-disposition and of being-in-a-position holding between, on the one hand, the thing 
that is in a disposition and the διαθετόν and, on the other hand, between the thing that is in a 
position and the “positional equivalent” of the ἑκτόν or διαθετόν45. As concerns the διαθετόν, 
the problem is inverted in comparison to the case of the “ἑκτόν” in Porphyry et alii: the literal 
translation of “διαθετόν” would be “dispositionable” 46 , but the contextual meaning, in 
Simplicius, prevents us from saying that “διαθετόν” refers to the bearer of the disposition. J. 
Groisard suggests translating “διαθετόν” as “la manière d’être diposée”, “the way of being 
disposed”47. On the same basis, one could say that the position is the relation (σχέσις) of being-
in-a-position that holds between the bearer of the position and “the way of being positioned”. 
However, it is not easy to know to what exactly the “ἑκτόν”, the “διαθετόν” and their “positional 
equivalent” refer in Simplicius. One solution would be to say that they are “specifying items”, 
i.e. that they serve to express the fact that habits, dispositions and positions must be “specified”, 
as Aristotle may do, according to J. Ackrill and K. Oehler48. Simplicius, in his commentary on 
Physics VII, holds, following Aristotle, that bodily habits are relative in that they are “due 
proportions” (συμμετρίαι) or “disproportions” (ἀσυμμετρίαι) of elements like “cold” and 
“heat”, and psychic “ethical habits” (ἠθικαὶ ἕξεις) relative in that they are “due proportions” 
(συμμετρίαι) or “disproportions” (ἀσυμμετρίαι) of “emotions” and “appetites” 49 . Like in 	
43 Ἕξις δὲ λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον οἷον ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἐχομένου, ὥσπερ πρᾶξίς τις ἢ κίνησις 
(ὅταν γὰρ τὸ μὲν ποιῇ τὸ δὲ ποιῆται, ἔστι ποίησις μεταξύ· οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐσθῆτα καὶ τῆς ἐχομένης 
ἐσθῆτος ἔστι μεταξὺ ἕξις)· – ταύτην μὲν οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν ἕξιν (εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ βαδιεῖται, 
εἰ τοῦ ἐχομένου ἔσται ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν) (…) (Met. Δ, 20, 1022b4-10, and Metaphysics, transl. W. D. Ross, in 
The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, op. cit.; referred to by C. Kalbfleisch and 
B. Fleet). 
44 See SIMPLICIUS, In Cat., CAG VIII, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, 164.22. 
45 The διαθετόν is mentioned as parallel to the ἑκτόν in SIMPLICIUS, In Cat., CAG VIII, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, 
163.32. As for the “positional equivalent” of the ἑκτόν and the διαθετόν, the natural candidate would be the 
“θετόν”. Now, the “θετόν” do appear in SIMPLICIUS, In Cat., CAG VIII, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, 165.3, but it 
seems to refer to the bearer of the disposition. The translation suggested by J. Groisard is “le positionnable”, 
in SIMPLICIUS, Commentaire aux Catégories d’Aristote, CAG VIII, 155.30-205.35, working translation. 
46 In SIMPLICIUS, On Aristotle’s “Categories 7-8”, transl. B. Fleet, op. cit., “διαθετόν” is translated as 
“conditionable”. 
47 See SIMPLICIUS, Commentaire aux Catégories d’Aristote, CAG VIII, 155.30-205.35, working translation 
by J. Groisard. 
48  See ARISTOTLE, Categories and De Interpretatione, comm. J. L. Ackrill, op. cit., ad 6a36 and 
ARISTOTELES, Kategorien, comm. K. Oehler, op. cit., ad 6a36 sq., discussed above. 
49 SIMPLICIUS, In Phys., CAG X, ed. H. Diels, 1067.5-20 and 1071.18-30, transl. Ch. Hagen. 
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Aristotle, such an explanation could apply to dispositions, but not to positions, which have 
seemingly nothing to do with “due proportion” nor “disproportion”. Thus, the account of the 
relativity of habits and dispositions that Simplicius gives in his commentary of Categories VII 
is different from the one that emerges in Physics VII, as he himself suggests50. In other words, 
the sense in which habits, dispositions and positions are relative in the commentary of the 
Categories can hardly be elucidated with the help of the information present in the commentary 
of the Physics. It seems that habits and dispositions are (i) relative in a way that is common to 
them and positions, i.e. by being “relations” (σχέσεις) holding between their bearer and, maybe, 
a specifying item, and (ii) relative in a way proper to them, i.e. bodily habits and psychic ethical 
habits are “due proportions” or “disproportions”.  
It is also difficult to know in what sense the “habit” (habitus) is relative in Boethius. 
According to him, the habit is of a “habilis res”51, which is the Latin equivalent of the Greek 
“ἑκτόν”. Now, it seems that the “habilis res” is not the bearer of the habit, but probably some 
sort of specifying item. Indeed, Boethius says that “the habit is of the thing that can be had” 
and “it is by the habit that we have the things that can be had”52. However, when discussing 
“disposition” (dispositio), Boethius affirms that the case of the disposition being of the disposed 
thing and the disposed thing being disposed by disposition belongs to the more general case of 
“every affection being the affection of the affected thing and every affected thing being affected 
by the affection”53. Thus, it seems that a disposition is relative to the thing that it affects, namely 
the bearer of the disposition, but this creates a kind of discrepancy: habit is relative to the 
“havable” or “had thing” probably understood as a specifying item, whereas disposition is 
relative to the bearer of the disposition. The discrepancy increases when Boethius adds that 
habit, disposition, and position are all relative in the same manner: 
 
Position is also relative. Indeed, the position is the position of the positioned thing, and the 
positioned thing is positioned by the position, and this should be understood according to the 
preceding mode of the habit and the disposition54. 
 	
50 See SIMPLICIUS, In Cat., CAG VIII, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, 177.22-27. 
51 habitus habilis rei habitus (BOETHIUS, In Cat., PL 64, ed. J.-P. Migne, 219A). 
52 illius enim rei habitus est quae haberi potest (…) ipso enim habitu res quae haberi possunt habemus 
(BOETHIUS, In Cat., PL 64, ed. J.-P. Migne, 219A). 
53 omnis affectio affecti affectio est, et omne affectum affectione affectum est (BOETHIUS, In Cat., PL 64, ed. 
J.-P. Migne, 219A). 
54 Positio quoque relativa est, nam positio positea rei positio est, et posita res positione posita est, et hoc 
intelligi convenit secundum priorem habitus et dispositionis modum (BOETHIUS, In Cat., PL 64, ed. J.-P. 
Migne, 219A-B). 
	 11 
One solution would be to admit that disposition and position are relative to their bearer, whereas 
habit is relative to a “specifying item”, and to say that the common element between them is 
merely grammatical: the habit/disposition/position is of the had/disposed/positioned thing, and 
the had/disposed/positioned thing is had/disposed/positioned by the habit/disposition/position. 
In other words, the correlation is made, on the one hand, with a genitive and, on the other hand, 
with what Boethius calls a “seventh case”, i.e. apparently an ablative without preposition55.  
Now, although it is difficult to establish in what sense exactly in Boethius, like in other 
early readers of Aristotle, habits and dispositions are relative, there is no doubt that for him, 
knowledge, like sensation, is relative in the sense that it is of an “object”: whereas sensation is 
relative to the “sensible” (sensible), knowledge is relative to the “knowable” (scibile)56. In the 
Greek commentators too, even if it is hard to see in what sense habits and dispositions are 
relative, there is no doubt that knowledge, taken as a cognition, is relative to an “object”. At 
very least, the fact that cognition, by being relative to a “cognizable” (γνωστόν), is more 
obviously relative than “ethical habits” understood as “due proportions” is explicitly stated in 
Simplicius’s Physics commentary57. Thus, in all these authors, knowledge seems to have a 
proper relativity, which is of another nature than the relativity of habits and dispositions in 
general. Now, the question arises as to whether the habit and the disposition of knowledge are 
relative to an “object” and relative in the same manner as other habits or dispositions, or 
whether they are just relative to an “object”. According to Simplicius, the relativity of habits 
and dispositions understood as “due proportion” or “disproportion” does not apply to cognitive 
habits and dispositions: cognition is not relative in that sense, but in the sense that it is of an 
“object”, i.e. “of the cognizable” (τοῦ γνωστοῦ)58. However, in Simplicius, as well as in the 
other early commentators of Aristotle, there is also a sense in which habits and dispositions are 
	
55 On this grammatical structure, which also applies to knowledge and sensation, see BOETHIUS, In Cat., PL 
64, ed. J.-P. Migne, 217D-218A. On the “seventh case”, see G. SERBAT, Le septimus casus en latin : un cas-
fantôme ?, in Florilegium historiographiae linguisticae. Études d’historiographie de la linguistique et de 
grammaire comparée à la mémoire de Maurice Leroy, J. de Clercq – P. Desmet (eds.), Peeters, Louvain-la-
Neuve 1994 (Bibliothèque des Cahiers de Linguistique de Louvain, 75), pp. 159-172, reprint in G. SERBAT, 
Opera disiecta. Travaux de linguistique générale, de langue et littérature latines, L. Nadjo (ed.), Peeters, 
Paris-Louvain 2001 (Bibliothèque de l’information grammaticale, 49), pp. 333-344. I thank Charles Girard 
for the precious conversation we had on habits in Boethius. 
56 See notably the commentary on Cat. VII, 7b22-8a12 in BOETHIUS, In Cat., PL 64, ed. J.-P. Migne, 229A-
233D.  
57 SIMPLICIUS, In Phys., CAG X, ed. H. Diels, 1074.13-19, who bases his claim on Phys. VII, 3, 247b2-3. 
See also the Neoplatonic commentaries of Cat. VII, 7b22-8a12, above all PORPHYRY, In Cat., ed. A. Busse, 
CAG IV.1, 118.5-121.19 and SIMPLICIUS, In Cat., CAG VIII, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, 190.31-196.33. Note that 
the relativity of knowledge is ontologically weakened in ELIAS, In Cat., CAG XVIII.1, ed. A. Busse, 203.20-
29 and 238.28-33. I will come back to this point below. 
58 SIMPLICIUS, In Phys., CAG X, ed. H. Diels, 1074.13-19. 
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relative in the same way as positions. Maybe in this sense, knowledge is relative like all other 
habits and dispositions and relative to an “object”59. At any rate, Aristotle’s early commentators 
count habits and dispositions in general, and knowledge in particular, among relatives, and 
seem to think that knowledge is not – or not only – relative like other habits or dispositions, but 
– or but also – in the sense that it is relative to an “object”. Yet, according to Aristotle, habits 
and dispositions, including the habit and disposition of knowledge, are qualities. Thus, 
following Aristotle, his commentators had to tackle the problem of the dual categorization of 
habits and dispositions, and of knowledge in particular. 
 
III. Saving Aristotle 
According to Porphyry and Simplicius, the dual categorization of habits and dispositions is 
problematic. Indeed, since for Aristotle, “the differentiae of genera which are different and not 
subordinate one to the other are themselves different in kind”60, the dual categorization of an 
item would entail that one and the same thing has different specific differences61. It is not 
wholly obvious what the problem is. Maybe Porphyry and Simplicius’ point is that things 
falling under different specific differences form non-overlapping extensions, so that in the case 
of a dual categorization, one and the same thing would become a member of such extensions.  
Be that as it may, in Porphyry’s reading of Categories VIII, 11a20-36, there is apparently 
no problem with saying that the habit of knowledge is only relative at the level of the genus, 
whereas its individuals, as well as its most specific species, e.g. grammar or music, are 
qualities62. Porphyry’s idea is to follow Aristotle’s statement: “by a quality I mean that in virtue 
of which things are said to be qualified somehow”63, then to defend the idea that Aristarchus or 
Aristoxenus are said to be grammarians or musicians from the individual grammar or music 
that they possess, whereas they are not qualified “from the generic knowledge” (ἀπὸ τῆς γενικῆς 
ἐπιστήμης), and finally to conclude that their individual grammar and music are qualities, 
whereas knowledge as a genus is not. On the contrary, the individual grammars and musics of 
Aristarchus or Aristoxenus are not themselves relative since, following Aristotle, “grammar is 
called knowledge of something (not grammar of something) and music knowledge of 
	
59 As said above, the fact that something can be differently relative in itself and according to its genus is 
considered by Aristotle himself in Top. IV, 4, 124b32-34. 
60 Τῶν ἑτερογενῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα τεταγμένων ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει καὶ αἱ διαφοραί (Cat. III, 1b16-17). 
61 See PORPHYRY, In Cat., CAG IV.1, ed. A. Busse, 139.22-28 and SIMPLICIUS, In Cat., CAG VIII, ed. C. 
Kalbfleisch, 291.21-28. 
62 See PORPHYRY, In Cat., CAG IV.1, ed. A. Busse, 140.2-23. 
63 Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ' ἣν ποιοί τινες λέγονται (Cat. VIII, 8b25, transl. J. Ackrill). 
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something (not music of something)”64; but knowledge as such, i.e. as a genus, is indeed 
relative, namely to the knowable. And any attempt to relate grammar to Aristarchus would be 
in vain, since the converse, namely “Aristarchus is of grammar”, is false. What about this 
argument? The last mentioned point seems unjustified: this grammar could be the grammar of 
this grammarian, and this grammarian could be a grammarian thanks to this grammar. Porphyry 
knows that correlates must be rightly picked out, otherwise the converse relation would be never 
given, for any relative65. And does not Porphyry himself say that every quality is relative by 
being “of something qualified” (ποιοῦ) 66 ? The rest of Porphyry’s argument is no less 
problematic: the most specific species of knowledge, for Porphyry, are meant to be included in 
the category of quality; yet it is seemingly not in virtue of them that Aristarchus or Aristoxenus 
are said to be grammarians or musicians, but in virtue of individual knowledges. This problem 
would not have occurred if Porphyry had said, like other commentators, that the things that 
“qualify” are not just the individuals of the most specific species, but the species themselves67. 
Besides, in Porphyry, the thesis according to which one is not qualified “from the generic 
knowledge” is not thoroughly justified. Olympiodorus defends this by holding that “it is 
impossible for one and the same man to know everything”68, i.e. to have all knowledges: 
grammar, music, etc., or to have “first philosophy” (πρώτη φιλοσοφία). But the argument is 
problematic. Indeed, is it not enough to fall under one species of ‘being knowledgeable’ in order 
to fall under the genus ‘being knowledgeable’? It seems that falling under a genus is 
independent of falling under the whole set of species of a genus. Elias holds that one man cannot 
have all knowledge, because, as Plato says, every particular man is only a “fragment” (κέρμα) 
of man, i.e. no one can have any universal whatsoever69. But this was probably not Aristotle’s 
point. More broadly, the “conflict with Aristotle's whole idea of a genus-species classification 
and categorial ladders”70 is still not solved with such considerations: specific and individual 
knowledges are not relative, but their genus is. As a matter of fact, Elias, when discussing 	
64 οἷον ἡ γραμματικὴ οὐ λέγεται τινὸς γραμματικὴ οὐδ' ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς μουσική, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα κατὰ τὸ γένος 
καὶ αὗται πρός τι λέγεται (Cat. VIII, 11a29-31, transl. J. Ackrill). 
65 See Cat. VII, 6a28-7b14 and its commentary in PORPHYRY, In Cat., CAG IV.1, ed. A. Busse, 115.17-
117.31. 
66 PORPHYRY, In Cat., CAG IV.1, ed. A. Busse, 114.9-12. 
67 On this question, see AMMONIUS, In Cat., CAG IV.4, ed. A. Busse, 91.10-28, PHILOPONUS, In Cat., CAG 
XIII.1, ed. A. Busse, 162.7-11, OLYMPIODORUS, In Cat., CAG XII.1, ed. A. Busse, 129.24-25, ELIAS, In 
Cat., CAG XVIII.1, ed. A. Busse, 238.22-25, and BOETHIUS, In Cat., PL 64, ed. J.-P. Migne, 259C-260C. 
68 πάντα γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπίστασθαι (OLYMPIODORUS, In Cat., CAG XII.1, ed. 
A. Busse, 129.28). 
69 ELIAS, In Cat., CAG XVIII.1, ed. A. Busse, 238.15-21. As A. Busse indicates (see ad 167.9-10), the word 
“fragment” (κέρμα) is not to be found in Plato. 
70 ARISTOTLE, Categories and De Interpretatione, comm. J. L. Ackrill, op. cit., ad 11a20. 
	 14 
Categories VIII, 11a20-36, wonders how a genus could be relative without its species also 
being relative71. Many of Porphyry’s arguments are taken over by Simplicius72. However, 
Simplicius adds an important point: 
 
I think we should say that Aristotle did not mean that the genera were not qualities, nor that 
the generic habit or disposition is not a quality; what he did mean was that even if habit and 
disposition are said to be relative, this is not true of all habit and disposition, but only generic. 
But all habit and disposition, generic and individual, is quality. It is nothing absurd for 
generic habit to be relative as well, and individual habits to be only qualities, because 
individual habits were not presented as belonging to the genus Relation, but as belonging to 
the genus Quality. For knowledge as being relative is not cut up into species, but as quality 
it is divided into particular branches of knowledge, which are not relative, as has been shown, 
but are qualities.73 
 
In sum, for Simplicius, Aristotle does not say that the genus ‘knowledge’ is “just” relative. 
Otherwise, not only would non-relative species and individuals belong to a relative genus, but 
a non-qualitative genus would have qualitative species and individuals. In such a situation, there 
would be a still stronger “conflict with Aristotle's whole idea of a genus-species classification 
and categorial ladders”, and despite Simplicius’ affirmations, it is not impossible that Aristotle 
is committed to this stronger conflict. At least, Elias explicitly reads Categories VIII, 11a20-36 
as holding that the genus ‘knowledge’ is not a quality74. On the contrary, for Simplicius, there 
is, in Aristotle, a double-faced genus, ‘knowledge’, both relative and a quality, of which only 
one “side” is specified and individuated: knowledge as relative is not divided into species and 
individuals, whereas knowledge as a quality is. Despite its exegetical charity, Simplicius’ 
reading has also some disadvantages: indeed, admitting a non-instantiated genus is not very 
Aristotelian. But the most obvious problem with Simplicius’ interpretation is that it reintegrates 
	
71 ELIAS, In Cat., CAG XVIII.1, ed. A. Busse, 238.22-28, which, as A. Busse indicates, refers to 153.11-15 
and, through it, to Cat. III, 1b10-15; see also 203.21-24. 
72 SIMPLICIUS, In Cat., CAG VIII, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, 291.28-292.19. 
73 ῥητέον δὴ οἶμαι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν τὰ γένη μὴ εἶναι ποιότητας οὐδὲ ὅτι ἡ γενικὴ ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις 
οὐκ ἔστιν ποιότης, ἀλλ' ὅτι, εἰ καὶ εἴρηται πρός τι ἡ ἕξις καὶ ἡ διάθεσις, οὐ πᾶσα ἔχει τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἡ γενικὴ 
μόνον· ποιότης μέντοι πᾶσα, καὶ ἡ γενικὴ καὶ ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα. καὶ οὐδὲν ἄτοπον τὴν μὲν γενικὴν ἕξιν καὶ πρός 
τι εἶναι, τὰς δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα ποιότητας μόνον, διότι οὐχὶ τοῦ ὡς πρός τι γένους ἐδόθησαν αἱ καθ' ἕκαστα ἕξεις, 
ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὡς ποιότητος. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ὡς μὲν πρός τι οὐ τέμνεται εἰς εἴδη, ὡς δὲ ποιότης διαιρεῖται εἰς 
τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστήμας, αἵτινες πρός τι μὲν οὔκ εἰσιν, ὡς ἀποδέδεικται, ποιότητες δέ εἰσιν (SIMPLICIUS, 
In Cat., CAG VIII, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, 293.22-31, transl. B. Fleet – who reads τοῦ instead of τῆς at 293.28 –
, modified for “ἕξις” and “διάθεσις”). 
74 See ELIAS, In Cat., CAG XVIII.1, ed. A. Busse, 238.8-10.  
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the dual categorization in a theory created to get ride of it. Elias, apparently more for his own 
sake than for Aristotle’s75, says that the genus ‘knowledge’ can be thought of both as a quality 
and as a relative, but that it is a quality “by nature” (κατὰ φύσιν), whereas it is a relative only 
“according to a secondary way of talking” (κατὰ δεύτερον λόγον), and this explains why its 
species are said to be qualities but not relatives: only what is predicated “by nature” of 
knowledge is transmitted to its species76. In contrast to Simplicius, Elias does not strictly admit 
a dual categorization of knowledge, but the consequence is that he ontologically weakens the 
relative aspect of knowledge.  
At any rate, Simplicius’ and Elias’ positions invite us to consider the second solution 
given by Aristotle, namely the admission of the dual categorization, which is a “sharper” 
(ἀκριβέστερον) solution than the first for Philoponus77. Porphyry presents the second solution 
as follows: 
 
I claim that if one does not wish to accept this solution, one should adopt the other one, 
namely that nothing prevents the same thing from falling into two categories. This is in no 
way absurd: it would be absurd if the same thing in one and the same respect were to be put 
into two different genera of predication that were not subordinate to one another, but there is 
no absurdity if it is considered in respect of different significations. Socrates, for instance, 
can be pointed out in many ways corresponding to his affections: insofar as he is a man, he 
is a substance; insofar as he is three cubits tall, let us suppose, he is quantified; insofar as he 
is a father or a son, he belongs to the relatives; insofar as he is temperate, he is qualified; and 
in this way he is brought under the different categories in virtue of various differentiae. If, 
then, Socrates, who is a single thing, is found <to fall under different categories> when he is 
considered in different respects, what is absurd about a habit being in one respect a relative, 
and in another a quality?78 	
75 Compare ELIAS, In Cat., CAG XVIII.1, ed. A. Busse, 238.8-10 and 238.28-33; see also 203.12-29. 
76 ELIAS, In Cat., CAG XVIII.1, ed. A. Busse, 238.28-33; see also 203.12-29. 
77 See PHILOPONUS, In Cat., CAG XIII.1, ed. A. Busse, 161.31-162.3 and 162.19-22. 
78  Φημὶ τοίνυν ὡς εἰ μή τις ταύτην προσίεται, ἀλλ' ἐκείνην γε λαμβανέτω, ὅτι οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν δυσὶ 
κατηγορίαις τὸ αὐτὸ τετάχθαι. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, ἀλλ' εἰ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ εἰ αὐτό τι εἰς δύο γένη 
κατηγοριῶν διάφορα ἀναφέροιτο καὶ μὴ ὑπάλληλα, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο σημαινόμενον οὐδεμία ἐστὶν 
ἀτοπία. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης πολλὰ πεπονθώς ἐπιδειχθήσεται· καθὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐσία ἐστί, καθὸ δὲ 
τρίπηχυς, εἰ τύχοι, ποσόν, καθὸ δὲ πατὴρ ἢ υἱὸς τῶν πρός τι, καθὸ δὲ σώφρων ποιός, καὶ οὕτως εἰς τὰς ἄλλας 
κατηγορίας κατά τινας διαφορὰς ἀνάγεται. εἰ οὖν ἓν ὢν εὑρίσκεται ὁ Σωκράτης κατ' ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο εἰς ἄλλην 
καὶ ἄλλην κατηγορίαν άναγόμενος, τί ἄτοπον, εἰ καὶ ἡ ἕξις κατ' ἄλλο μὲν ἂν ῥηθείη πρός τι, κατ' ἄλλο δὲ 
ποιότης; (PORPHYRY, In Cat., CAG IV.1, ed. A. Busse, 140.26-141.5, transl. S. Strange – who does not 
follow Busse’s proposition of correction at 140.28, but adds εἰς ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην κατηγορίαν άναγόμενος at 
141.3, as proposed by Busse –, slightly modified, notably for πολλὰ ἐπιδειχθήσεται πεπονθώς, following 
PORPHYRE, Commentaire aux Catégories d’Aristote, ed., transl. and comm. R. Bodéüs, Vrin, Paris 2008 
[Textes philosophiques], who reads πολλὰ πεπονθώς ἐπιδειχθήσεται, and for “ἕξις”). 
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According to R. Bodéüs, there is a fallacy here79. Indeed, at first sight, Porphyry’s explanations 
are dubious: Socrates by himself is an individual man, i.e. a primary essence, and does not 
belong as such to different categories; when, for example, Socrates as temperate is said to be a 
“qualified thing”, it is only to the extent that he forms an “accidental compound” with the 
quality of temperance, and when Socrates as a father is said to be a “relative”, it is only to the 
extent that he forms an “accidental compound” with the relational property of fatherhood80. In 
sum, Porphyry is not talking about one and the same thing, nor about one and the same thing 
“considered in different respects” (κατ' ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο), but about different “things”, i.e., in the 
examples given above, a primary essence and two different accidental compounds. Such 
considerations were maybe part of the reasons leading Olympiodorus to reject the idea that one 
and the same thing “considered in different respects” (πρὸς ἄλλο μέντοι καὶ ἄλλο) could belong 
to two categories81. However, Porphyry’s point can be clarified and becomes more plausible 
when we look at the parallel passage in Simplicius82. According to Simplicius, the things meant 
to belong to different categories are “complex things” (σύνθετα)83, for example Socrates taken 
with all or several of his accidental properties. He is complex, but made up of “uncomplex” 
(ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς) or “simple” (ἁπλᾶ) elements, which, in turn, belong only to one category84. 
Such “complex things” are not just to be found among primary essences taken with their 
accidental properties. For example, “in the case of an affection there is the aspect of completion 
– the result of the affection – and the aspect of cause – that which produces the affection”85. In 
other words, an “affection” (πάθος) has in fact two distinct, simple constituents, namely its 
static being as the result or outcome of a given causal influence (e.g. the heat of a stone that is, 
or was, in the sun), and its dynamic being as the passive process itself that corresponds to the 
causal influence in question (e.g. the being-heated, or having-been-heated, of the stone by the 	
79 PORPHYRE, Commentaire aux Catégories d’Aristote, comm. R. Bodéüs, op. cit., ad 140.30-141.4. 
80  On the notion of “accidental compound”, see F. A. LEWIS, Substance and Predication in Aristotle, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991. 
81 See OLYMPIODORUS, In Cat., CAG XII.1, ed. A. Busse, 129.15-30. 
82 See SIMPLICIUS, In Cat., CAG VIII, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, 292.19-293.9 and 293.32-294.15, transl. B. Fleet. 
83  I change B. Fleet’s translation of “σύνθετον” from “compound” to “complex”, and correlatively the 
“uncompounded” of “ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς” in “uncomplex”, in order to avoid a confusion with F. Lewis’ notion 
of “accidental compound”. 
84 I recall, following B. Fleet (SIMPLICIUS, On Aristotle’s “Categories 7-8”, comm. B. Fleet, op. cit., p. 184 
n. 549), that for the Neoplatonic philosophers, the categories, as Ph. Hoffmann says, “sont, dans le langage 
qui procède de l’âme humaine, les mots simples qui signifient les réalités simples (ou genres suprêmes) par 
la médiation des notions simples qui sont dans l’âme. C’est ce système à trois termes (mots, notions, réalités) 
qui constitue la nature de la catégorie” (Ph. HOFFMANN, Catégories et langage selon Simplicius – La question 
du "skopos" du traité aristotélicien des “Catégories”, in Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Actes du 
colloque international de Paris [28 sept. – 1er oct. 1985], I. Hadot [ed.], op. cit., pp. 61-90, p. 67). 
85 πάθους ὄντος τοῦ μὲν ἐν ἀποτελέσματι, ὅπερ ἐκ πάθους γέγονεν, τοῦ δὲ ὡς αἰτίου, ὅπερ ἐμποιεῖ πάθος 
(SIMPLICIUS, In Cat., CAG VIII, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, 294.6-8, transl. B. Fleet). 
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sun). Applying this to habits and dispositions, more precisely to knowledge, the result is the 
following: knowledge is a “complex thing” (σύνθετον), made up of two “simple” elements 
(ἁπλᾶ), a quality and a relational property. Maybe this is also what Boethius means when he 
says, less clearly: 
 
In the same manner, habits, to the extent that they are habits of a certain thing, are included 
among relations and, to the extent that things are said to be qualified according to them, are 
counted among qualities86. 
 
Since the “dual categorization” concerns a complex thing, it becomes harmless. Such a solution 
is not implausible, but it entails that the “τὸ αὐτό” in “εἰ τυγχάνει τὸ αὐτὸ ποιὸν καὶ πρός τι ὄν” 
of Categories VIII, 11a37-38 refers to a σύνθετον.  
Another solution is offered by Ammonius, who thinks that the statement in Categories 
VIII, 11a37-38 concerns only relatives: 
 
But above all, there is no paradox when some things classified under another category are 
also classified under relatives. Rather it is altogether necessary that what is subsumed under 
relatives be classified under some other category as well; for it has been pointed out that 
relatives do not contain proper things; rather, they are observed in other categories.87 
 
Indeed, according to Ammonius, “relatives seem to be offshoots and not distinct things, but 
rather are found in other categories”88. Even if Ammonius rejects the idea that relatives are 
“proper things” (ἴδια πράγματα), this probably does not mean that they have no being. Indeed, 
at the beginning of his commentary on Chapter VII of the Categories, he clearly holds that 
relatives have an “existence” (ὑπόστᾰσις), and this “by nature” (φύσει)89. More than a denial 
of the existence of relatives, Ammonius’ idea is presumably that relational properties are always 	
86 Ita quoque et habitudines in eo quod alicuius rei habitudines sunt, in relatione ponuntur, in eo quod 
secundum eas quales aliqui dicuntur, in qualitate numerantur (BOETHIUS, In Cat., PL 64, ed. J.-P. Migne, 
261C, with “aliqui” instead of “aliquid”, on the basis of “quidam quales” at 240A and “aliqui quales” at 
260D). 
87 ἄλλως τε δὲ οὐδὲν ἄτοπόν τινα τῶν ἀναφερομένων ἐπὶ ἑτέραν κατηγορίαν ἀναφέρεσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ τὰ πρός 
τι, μᾶλλον δὲ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὰ ὑπὸ τὰ πρός τι ἀναγόμενα ἀνάγεσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ ἄλλην τινὰ κατηγορίαν· εἴρηται 
γὰρ ὅτι ἴδια πράγματα οὐκ ἔχει τὰ πρός τι, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κατηγορίαις θεωρεῖται (AMMONIUS, In Cat., 
CAG IV.4, ed. A. Busse, 91.28-92.2, transl. S. Cohen, G. Matthews, slightly modified).  
88 παραφυάσιν ἔοικεν εἶναι τὰ πρός τι καὶ πράγματα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀφωρισμένα, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κατηγορίαις 
εὑρίσκεται (AMMONIUS, In Cat., CAG IV.4, ed. A. Busse, 69.24-26, transl. S. Cohen, G. Matthews; referred 
to in AMMONIUS, On Aristotle Categories, transl. and comm. S. M. Cohen, G. B. Matthews, op. cit., p 112 
n. 141). The idea that relatives are “offshoots” (παραφυάδες) comes from Nic. Eth. I, 4, 1096a21-22.  
89 AMMONIUS, In Cat., CAG IV.4, ed. A. Busse, 66.21-67.11.  
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founded on something of another category90. Such a move could be based on the statement of 
Aristotle in Metaphysics, Ν, 1 saying: “the relative is a certain affection of the quantified”91. 
According to such an interpretation, Categories VIII, 11a37-38 would simply be a reminder 
that relational properties come together with a member of another category. The same 
interpretation is maybe made by Philoponus. Indeed, even if he says, like Porphyry and 
Simplicius, that it is not a problem for one thing to belong to different categories “considered 
in different respects” (κατ' ἄλλο μέντοι καὶ ἄλλο), the examples he gives are father and son92. 
Olympiodorus and Elias suggest the same solution as Ammonius, and this solution is even 
briefly evocated in Porphyry93. In fact, the idea that Categories VIII, 11a37-38 is limited to 
relatives had earlier been defended by Alexander of Aphrodisias:  
 
But Alexander of Aphrodisias thinks that this – the fact of some relatives being classed under 
another category – happens only in the case of relatives, because what is relative does not 
even have its own substrate in the first place, but has its being in various different categories. 
(…) Alexander observed that it was a particular feature of relatives always to exist along 
with another category; for example a father with Substance, the larger with the Quantified, 
the friend with the Qualified, the striker with Activity, etc.94  
 
Holding that the “father” exists with “substance”, or “essence” (οὐσία), does not seem to make 
the point, since every accident needs an essence. But the idea probably is that being a father is 	
90 Compare to Simplicius, who also says that “relatives do not exist in their own right but have [their] being 
in other things” (τὰ πρός τι μή ἐστι καθ' αὑτά, ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλοις τὸ εἶναι ἔχει; SIMPLICIUS, In Phys., CAG X, ed. 
H. Diels, 1071.2-3, transl. Ch. Hagen; see also SIMPLICIUS, In Phys., CAG X, ed. H. Diels, 835.21-23 and 
837.7-9), and who nevertheless defends at length the existence of relatives (see SIMPLICIUS, In Cat., CAG 
VIII, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, 169.1-171.22, specially 170.4-5). Here too, the idea seems to be that relational 
properties are founded on other categories, not that they have no existence. 
91 πάθος τι τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ πρός τι (Met. N, 1, 1088a24-25). 
92 PHILOPONUS, In Cat., CAG XIII.1, ed. A. Busse, 162.25-28. It is likely that Philoponus’ position resemble 
the one of Ammonius, due to the dependence of his commentary on Ammonius’ one (on these questions, see 
A. BUSSE, Praefatio and Supplementa praefationis, in Ammonius, In Cat., CAG IV.4, pp. v-lvi, and 
Praefatio and Supplementum praefationis, in Philoponus, In Cat., CAG XIII.1, pp. v-xvi). Certainly, 
Boethius too, in the parallel passage, only gives the examples of father, but he also says that one thing 
considered in different respects can belong to more than two categories (BOETHIUS, In Cat., PL 64, ed. J.-P. 
Migne, 261C). 
93 See OLYMPIODORUS, In Cat., CAG XII.1, ed. A. Busse, 129.30-34 and ELIAS, In Cat., CAG XVIII.1, ed. 
A. Busse, 238.33-239.2, as well as PORPHYRY, In Cat., CAG IV.1, ed. A. Busse, 114.12-13. 
94 ὁ μέντοι Ἀφροδισιεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπὶ μόνων τῶν πρός τι συμβαίνειν οἴεται τοῦτο τὸ τινὰ τῶν πρός τι καὶ 
ὑπ' ἄλλην κατηγορίαν ἀνάγεσθαι, διότι τὴν ἀρχὴν τὸ πρός τι οὐδὲ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἄλλης 
καὶ ἄλλης κατηγορίας τὸ εἶναι εἶχεν. (…) ἴδιον δέ τι ἐπὶ τῶν πρός τι ἐνεῖδεν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος τὸ πάντως σὺν 
ἄλλῃ κατηγορίᾳ ὑφεστάναι, ὡς ὁ μὲν πατὴρ μετὰ οὐσίας, τὸ δὲ μεῖζον μετὰ ποσοῦ, ὁ δὲ φίλος μετὰ ποιοῦ 
καὶ ὁ τύπτων μετὰ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως (SIMPLICIUS, In Cat., CAG VIII, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, 
292.30-34 and 293.5-9, transl. B. Fleet, slightly modified, and, for the first sentence, following the 
suggestions made by an anonymous referee of this journal). 
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founded on a peculiar activity of man as a living being, namely its generative activity95. At any 
rate, Alexander’s idea is that relatives always depend on another category, and that this is the 
only point that Aristotle wants to make in Categories VIII, 11a37-38.  
Olympiodorus and Elias count three solutions to the problem of the dual categorization: 
(i) the acceptance of the dual categorization of one and the same thing “considered in different 
respects” (κατ' ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο); (ii) the sharing out of the dual categorization among species 
and genus; (iii) the assimilation of the supposed “dual categorization” to the dependence of 
relational properties on other categories96. But in fact, the plausible version of (i) is: (i’) the 
acceptance of the dual categorization to the extent that it holds of a “complex thing” (σύνθετον). 
And in the final analysis, as regards the very problem of the dual categorization of habits and 
dispositions in general, and of knowledge in particular, (i’) and (iii) are not that different: 
“habit”, “disposition” or “knowledge” refer to a complex thing made up of a quality and a 
relational property. 
 
IV. The fortune of Categories VIII, 11a20-38 
Considering the solutions that emerge from the early reception of Aristotle’s Categories VIII, 
11a20-38, the one holding that the dual categorization of habits and dispositions could be shared 
out among species and genus is hard to defend: the Aristotelian “categorial ladder” would lose 
its rungs. As for the mere dual categorization of one and the same thing, this should be rejected 
if Aristotle’s categories are meant to stay “mutually exclusive”97. The less problematic thesis 
seems to be that “the same thing” (τὸ αὐτό) can belong to two distinct categories if it is admitted 
that this “same thing” is not a simple, but a “complex thing” (σύνθετον) – whether this statement 
is limited to relatives or not. Thus, habits and dispositions are complex “relative-qualities”. 
Whereas it is difficult to establish in what sense habits and dispositions in general are relative 
– are they of a “subject”, must they be “specified”, are they “due proportions” or 
“disproportions”? – for the habit of knowledge, and for the disposition of unstable knowledge, 
there is less doubt about their relative character: like sensation, which is of an “object”, namely 
“of a sensible” (αἰσθητοῦ), knowledge too is of an “object”, namely “of a knowable” 	
95 Note that Aristotle’s classification of father among Met. Δ, 15, 1021a14-26’s relatives “according to 
potency” (κατὰ δύναμιν), i.e. “causal” relatives, is surely due to the fact that fatherhood is founded on the 
activity of generation. 
96 OLYMPIODORUS, In Cat., CAG XII.1, ed. A. Busse, 129.10-39 and ELIAS, In Cat., CAG XVIII.1, ed. A. 
Busse, 238.1-239.11. Olympiodorus holds that Aristotle mentions and defends only the second and the third 
solutions. 
97 See M. FREDE, “The Title, Unity and Authenticity of the Aristotelian Categories”, op. cit., p. 13, quoted 
above. 
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(ἐπιστητοῦ). Thus, at any rate, the habit and the disposition of knowledge are complex things 
in the sense that they are “qualities-relative-to-an-‘object’”.  
In fact, the dual categorization of the habit and disposition of knowledge in Aristotle is 
one of the first historical occurrences of a broader philosophical problem, still alive nowadays, 
concerning the ontological status of mental acts and states in general: are they “absolute” or 
“relative”? In other words, the dual categorization of the habit and disposition of knowledge 
echoes the problem of the absolute or relative nature of “intentionality”. Whereas today, 
Aristotle’s text is not explicitly mentioned in such discussions, this was indeed the case in the 
Scholastic and Neo-Scholastic traditions. For example, both Scotus and Suárez, in asking 
whether mental acts and states are absolute or relative, turned to Categories VIII, 11a20-38 and 
to Aristotle’s worries about this point98. In view of this, a historian will say that the Scholastics 
and Neo-Scholastics inherited the hesitations of Aristotle, and that these hesitations could have 
indirectly determined our contemporary discussions. A philosopher, without denying the 
historical influences, will add that there could be something in the nature of mental acts and 
states that invites both an absolute and a relative comprehension of these phenomena. Now, the 
discussions of Aristotle’s early commentators might inspire the philosopher in his inquiries: 
“mental act” or “mental state” are ambiguous expressions, which, at least sometimes, refer to a 
complex entity (a “σύνθετον”), both absolute and relative. In the contemporary context, one 
application of this idea could be the following: mental acts and states whose object exists are 
complex entities, in which one has to distinguish the aspect of mere “aboutness”, or 
“intentionality” stricto sensu, which could be understood as an ontologically absolute feature – 
i.e. nothing is required except thinking-of-a-centaur when thinking of a centaur –, from the 
aspect of “reference”, which is necessarily relational – i.e. referring to the world means having 
some sort of relation to the object of which the act or state is about99. However, this would only 
be a first step toward the elucidation of the exact nature of mental acts and states. Indeed, the 
question is largely open as to what exactly the relation of reference is: is it a causal relation, or 
	
98 See DUNS SCOTUS, Quod. XIII, ed. F. Alluntis (Cuestiones Cuodlibetales, La Editorial Catolica, Madrid, 
1968 [Biblioteca de autores cristianos]), notably §33, n°101-102 and F. SUÁREZ, DM XLVII, ed. J. Doyle 
(On Real Relation [Disputatio Metaphysicae XLVII], ed. and transl. J. P. Doyle, Marquette University Press, 
Milwaukee, WI 2006 [Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation]), notably section I and IV. 
99 For reference as distinct from intentionality, in that reference is a relation between the mental act or state 
and an existent object, whereas intentionality is independent of the existence of the object, see T. HORGAN – 
J. TIENSON, The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality, in Philosophy of 
Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, D. J. Chalmers (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002, 
pp. 520-533. For a theory were intentionality is something absolute to which a relation is added if the object 
of the act or state exists, see U. KRIEGEL, The Sources of Intentionality, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2011 (Philosophy of Mind). 
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is it another sort of relation, for example some sort of similarity? Again, going back to Aristotle, 
his reader will have some difficulties in establishing the status of the relation holding between 
knowledge and sensation and their objects, the knowable (ἐπιστητόν) and the sensible 
(αἰσθητόν): whereas in the De anima, this relation seems to be a peculiar kind of causal 
relation100, the De interpretatione says that the “affections of the soul” (παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς) 
are “similarities” (ὁμοιώματα) of the “things” (πράγματα)101. Here too, following Aristotle, 
there are important Scholastic debates on these points102. And again, hearing this, a historian 
and a philosopher will ask different questions. 
 			
	
100 See De anima II, 4, 416b33-34, III, 4, 429a13-15, and above all II, 5. On this peculiar causality in Aristotle, 
see the famous debate between R. Sorabji and M. Burnyeat originating in the two articles R. SORABJI, Body 
and Soul in Aristotle, «Philosophy» 49, 1974, pp. 63-89 (revised version in Articles on Aristotle. 4. 
Psychology and Aesthetics, J. Barnes – M. Schofield – R. Sorabji [eds.], Duckworth, London 1979, pp. 42-
64) and M. F. BURNYEAT, Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind still Credible?, in Essays on Aristotle's De 
anima, M. C. Nussbaum – A. Rorty (eds.), Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995 (Clarendon Aristotle Series), pp. 
15-26. 
101 De int. I, 16a3-9.  
102 See notably the discussions between Godfrey of Fontaines and James of Viterbo presented in A. CÔTÉ, 
L’objet et la cause de la connaissance selon Godefroid de Fontaines, «Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie 
und Theologie» 54, 2007, pp. 407-429, as well as the distinction between causality and reference in Scotus’s 
theory of cognition, presented in G. PINI, Can God Create My Thoughts? Scotus's Case against the Causal 
Account of Intentionality, «Journal of the History of Philosophy», 49, 2011, pp. 39-63. 
